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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. FRED FLEMING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
FLEMING FELT COMPANY, a 
corporation, and JOSEPH H. 
FELT and MARIE FEL'r, 







The appellants, Fleming Felt Company, a corpo-
ration, and :Marie Felt, petition the Court for a rehear-
ing in the above entitled cause, the Court by its opinion 
filed March 31, 1958, having affirmed, with modification, 
the judgment of the trial court. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
A. FRED FLEMING, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
FLEl\fiNG FELT COMPANY, a 
corporation, and JOSEPH H. 
FELT and ~IARIE FELT, 
Defendants an.d Appellants. 
Case 
No. 8732 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF IX SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PorNT No. 1 
THE COrRT HAS APPLIED A.N INCORRECT 
:\IE.A.SrRE OF DA:JIAGE 
This Court has determined on appeal that the evi-
dence in the record supports the finding of the trial court 
to the effect that the Felts breached their contract with 
FlL'ming, then'h~· entitling Fleming to damages. Flem-
ing- wns awarded dnmages in the sum of $13,512.00, which, 
as tJw (\nut says, .. is the yalue of the inventory he had 
put into the hnsi1w~~." In thi~ determination the Court 
Jws ig-nort>d the nwa~ure of damages which the law has 
Pstn hlished for hrenrl1 of contract. 
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This Court has apparently adopted the theory that 
the measure of damage is what Fleming put into the 
business. To award Fleming the value of his original 
inventory completely ignores the increase or decrease in 
the value of his share in the business from the time of 
merger to the date of the breach. 
The business was operated from August 31, 1953, to 
June, 1955, under the management of Fleming. Assume 
there had been a substantial growth in the business dur-
ing this period. Should not Fleming have the benefit of 
the proportionate increase in value of his interest and 
recover substantially more than $13,512? On the other 
hand, suppose that because of his mismanagement, or 
due to some other factor not the fault of the Felts, the 
value of the business declined, resulting in a propor-
tionate decrease in the value of Fleming's interest in the 
business at the time of the breach. In such case should 
the Felts be required to bear the whole burden thereof~ 
Obviously not, and that there was in fact a substantial 
loss prior to the breach is no mere supposition. The 
only financial statement admitted in evidence shows that 
there had been a substantial impairment of capital. Tht> 
business was losing money long prior to the breach. ~x­
hibit 12-P (R. 265). 
The adoption of the value of Fleming's original in-
ventory, $13,512, as a measure of damage is arhitra ry and 
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It is submitted that under the circumstances of this 
case the proper measure of damage is to allow Fleming 
the value of his interest in the business as of the date of 
the breach, not the value of his inventory nearly two years 
earlier. He should be allowed the same proportion of the 
inventory at the time of the breach as his original in-
ventory was of the total original inventory. 
There is no evidence that the parties made any con-
tributions to capital other than their original inventories, 
nor is there any claim that either of the parties failed to 
obtain salary or dividends to which he was entitled. Thus, 
an award of damages based upon a principle which allows 
Fleming his proportionate value of the inventory at the 
time of the breach is fair and equitable. 
However, as to the value of Fleming's interest in the 
business at the time of the breach there is no evidence 
in the record. If Fleming is to prevail he has the bur-
den of proving the amount of his damage. This he has 
failed to do. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court 
should be reversed, or, in the alternative, if this Court is 
of the opinion that Fleming should prevail in spite of 
such deficiency in the proof, the case should be remanded 
to the trial court to permit the introduction of additional 
evidence. 
Furthermore, in awarding to Fleming the value of 
the inventory he had put into the business, $13,512.00, the 
Court has ignored the fact that Fleming received and still 
has 13,512 shares of stock in the Fleming Felt Company. 
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PoiNT No. II. 
FLEMING'S DAl\iAGE SHOULD FURTHER 
BE REDUCED BY THE VALUE OF HIS 13,512 
SHARES OF STOCK OF THE FLEMING 
FELT COMPANY. 
Appellants contend that if Fleming were to receive 
the value of his share of the business at the time of the 
breach - or the original value of his inventory for that 
matter- such value should be reduced by the value of 
the shares of stock still remaining in his hands. The 
award of damages as it now stands is inequitable and 
unjustly enriches Fleming. 
The basic rule governing the measure of damages for 
breach of contract is well settled: 
''The measure of damages in the case of a 
breach of contract is the amount which will com-
pensate the injured person for the loss which a 
fulfillment of the contract would have prevented or 
the breach of it has entailed. In other words, the 
person injured is, so far as it is possible to do so 
by a monetary award, to be placed in the position 
he would have been in had the contract been per-
formed. Another statement of the rule is that, 
where one party to a contract repudiates it, the 
other party is entitled to recover the value of the 
contract to him at the time of its breach." 25 
C. J. S., Damages, Sec. 74, p. 563. 
Nor should Fleming be put in a better position by a 
recovery of damages for the breach of the contract than 
he would have been if there had been performance. 
United Protective Workers v. Ford Motor Co., 223 F. (2d) 
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49 ( CCA-7, 1955) ; Blair v. United States, 150 F. (2d) 676 
( CCA-8, 1945). 
Following this well established rule for the deter-
mination of damages, the contract should be analyzed to 
see what Fleming would have had had the contract been 
fulfilled, and then a determination should be made as to 
how the breach affected the same. 
Turning to the first matter: What would Fleming 
have had had the contract been fulfilled~ Basically he 
would have had two things: (1) a position as general 
manager of the Fleming Felt Company, and (2) 13,512 
shares of stock of the company. 
Now, the Court has sustained the finding of the trial 
court that there has been a breach of the contract, the re-
sult being that Fleming has lost his position as general 
manager of Fleming Felt Company. But he still has the 
13, 512 shares of stock of Fleming Felt Company. 
What is the measure of his damage~ As for the first 
element the Court has correctly interpreted the record, 
'' There was no proof that his wages or income would 
have been greater than he received from the Fleming Felt 
Corporation during the period; nor that he otherwise 
suffered damage.'' 
As for the second element of his damage, he still has 
his 13,512 shares of stock in the company. On this point 
he has not been damaged at all unless the breach of the 
contract has diminished the Yalue of the shares. Cer-
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tainly there is no evidence in the record of this being the 
case. On the other hand, the 13,512 shares were accepted 
at the outset as the value of the Fleming merchandise. 
It is therefore submitted that since Fleming would 
have continued to possess the 13,512 shares of stock of 
the Fleming Felt Company if the contract had not been 
breached, he should not have more than this upon the 
breach. 
However, the record is entirely devoid of any evi-
dence of a diminution in the value of the Fleming stock. 
The burden of such a showing was Fleming's. The judg-
ment of the trial court should therefore be reversed or, 
in the alternative, the case should be remanded to the trial 
court for a determination of the diminution in value, if 
any, of Fleming's 13,512 shares of stock by reason of 
the breach. 
On the other hand, if the Court grants to Fleming 
the value of his inventory put into the corporation in Au-
gust, 1953, or the value of Fleming's interest in the busi-
ness at the date of the breach, as contended for in Point 
~ o. I, then surely, there should be deducted from such 
a figure the value of the 13,512 shares of stock of Flem-
ing Felt Company he retains in his possession. Otherwise, 
Fleming will be unjustly enriched. 
The case of Eastern Terminal Lumber Co. v. Stit-
zinger, 35 F. (2d) 333 (CCA-3, 1929) followed the correct 
rule here contended for. In that case the firm of Stitzinger 
& Co. entered into a contract with the Lumber Company 
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whereby it became the selling agent for the Lumber Com-
pany in designated areas. The contract was to exist for 
some ten years, though on this point there was some 
dispute. Stitzinger was to receive commissions on sales 
of lumber. In addition, Stitzinger was to purchase capital 
stock of the Lumber Company to the extent of $15,000 to 
$25,000 at par of one hundred dollars per share. In the 
course of performance under the contract, Stitzinger sub-
scribed and paid for 150 shares, amounting to $15,000. 
Some months after entering into the contract the Lumber 
Company canceled the contract and commenced a suit to 
recover amounts claimed to be due on certain orders for 
lumber, etc. Stitzinger counterclaimed, charging the 
Lumber Company with breaching the contract, and sought 
to recover damages consisting principally of two items: 
(1) anticipated profits, and (2) damages which it suffered 
on account of the stock that had been purchased. 
It is the second element of damages that is analogous 
to the instant case. Stitzinger sought to recover the full 
$15,000 that had been paid for the stock, claiming that this 
was an element of damage which was suffered on account 
of the cancellation of the contract. The Lumber Company 
claimed, of course, that no damage was sustained. 
It is submitted that the Circuit Court correctly ap-
plied the law in disposing of this question. The trial court 
entered a directed verdict for the Lumber Company. The 
Circuit Court if Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed 
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''rrhey ask damages for the $15,000 which they 
were required to spend as an item in the contract 
and offer to surrender the stock. What that dam-
age is, if any, is a question for the jury under 
proper instructions of the court. When one party 
enters upon the performance of a contract and is 
prevented from so doing without fault on his part, 
one distinct item of damage is his outlay and ex-
penses less the value of the materials on hand, and 
it does not lie in the mol).th of the party who has 
wrongfully put an end to the contract to say that 
the other has not been damaged, at least to the 
amount of what he has been induced fairly and 
in good faith to lay out and expend, after making 
allowance for the material on hand. The outlay 
for this stock was made in good faith, without 
which the contract would not have been made. It 
is now in the nature of so much rna terial in the 
hands of the defendants. What the value is should 
be decided by the jury in resolving the question 
of damages. United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 
338, 345, 4 S. Ct. 81, 28 L. Ed. 168; Press Publish-
ing Co. v. Reading News Agency, 44 Pa. Super. 
Ct. 428. 
"In refusing to submit the questions of dam-
age to the jury, the learned District Judge fell into 
error, and the judgment is reversed and a new 
trial granted.'' 
In other situations where the party claiming a breach 
of contract has certain property on hand as a fruit of the 
contract, the courts have always required that this be 
taken into consideration in determining the damages suf-
fered. Bradley v. N evada-Califorwia-Oregon Ry., 178 P. 
906 (Nev.1919) ;Spitzerv.Pathe Exchange,23P. (2d) 308 
(Cal., 1933); Superior Tube Co. v. Delaware Aircraft In-
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dustries, 60 F. Supp. 573 (Dist. Ct., D. Del. 1945); White 
River Levee Dist. v. McWilli(J!ffl;s Dredging Co., 40 F. (2d) 
873 (CCA-8, 1930); Moline Furniture Works v. Club 
Holding Co.,. 274 N. W., 338 (Mich., 1937); Bremhorst v. 
Phillips Coal Co., 211 N. W. 898 (Iowa, 1927) ; Guerini 
Stone Co., v. P. J. Carlin Constr. Co., 248 U. S. 334, 63 L. 
Ed. 275; United States v. Behan, 110 U. S., 338, 28 L. 
Ed.168. 
Nor would it be proper to require Fleming to return 
his stock to Fleming Felt Company and then grant Flem-
ing the initial value of his merchandise inventory or the 
value of his interest in the business. That would be rescis-
sion and would not be proper in view of the determination 
by this Court that the basis for rescission does not exist. 
It is therefore apparent that even the general theory 
of damages adopted by the Court requires that rather 
than the value of his initial inventory, Fleming be award-
ed his proportionate interest in the business at the time 
of the breach, and that this value be reduced by the value 
of the 13,512 shares of stock of Fleming Felt Company 
remaining in his hands. 
Fleming has also failed in sustaining his burden in 
this regard, and the decision of the trial court should be 
reversed or, in the alternatiYe, the case should be re-
manded to the trial court for the determination of (1) the 
value of Fleming's interest in the business at the time of 
the hn'<teh, and (2) th0 value of Fleming's stock at that 
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It is therefore respectfully submitted that the judg-
ment of the trial court should be reversed or, in the alter-
native, the case should be remanded to the trial court for 
the purposes herein set forth. 
Respectfully submitted, 
::~?Ztlil ----~LAN & RICHARDS 
720 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
----~:z~~-21~~--~~-----------------------
Harold R. Boyer 
1409 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendwnts and .Appellants 
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